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California Institute of Technology, Pasadena 
The use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the net welfare payoffs from water projects has now been 
an established practice for many years. One of the interesting aspects of such cost-benefit studies is that 
water projects involve an uncertain flow of costs and benefits, arising from the stochastic nature of 
streamflows. Hence a basic problem for the cost-benefit analyst is that of incorporating this uncertainty 
into his measures of costs and benefits. In the present paper we examine the problem of computing an 
appropriate consumer surplus measure to evaluate water project benefits under uncertainty. Detailed 
treatment is given to the case in which a complete set of contingent claim markets exists in the economy 
as well as to the case of a spot market economy. The consumer surplus measure applicable to the 
contingent claim economy is a simple generalization of the measure that applies to a world of certainty, 
but in the case of a spot market economy there is an unobserved component of consumer benefits that 
limits the applicability of the usual consumer surplus measure. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the net welfare 
payoffs from water projects has now been an established prac-
tice for many years. One of the interesting aspects of such 
cost-benefit studies is that water projects involve an uncertain 
flow of costs and benefits, arising from the stochastic nature of 
streamflows. Hence a basic problem for the cost-benefit ana-
lyst is that of incorporating this uncertainty into his measures 
of costs and benefits. In the present paper, we examine the 
problem of computing an appropriate consumer surplus mea-
sure to evaluate water project benefits under uncertainty. De-
tailed treatment is given to the case in which a complete set of 
contingent claim markets exists in the economy, as well as to 
the case of a spot market economy. The consumer surplus 
measure applicable to the contingent claim economy is a 
simple generalization of the measure that applies to a world of 
certainty, but in the case of a spot market economy, there is 
an unobserved component of consumer benefits that limits the 
applicability of the usual consumer surplus measure. 
2. A CONTINGENT CLAIM WATER ECONOMY 
To keep the notational clutter to a minimum, we consider 
the case of a world in which there are two consumer goods, y 
and z, where y denotes the consumption of water and z is a 
nonwater good (say, a composite commodity). Again for sim-
plicity, we consider a modified pure trade world in which there 
is no production of z; consumption of z equals the endowment 
of consumers, while water availability is determined by 
random streamflows and storage capacity. The only uncer-
tainty in the first model we consider is uncertainty as to 
streamflows. Let ni, denote the probability of streamflow j in 
period t . There are assumed to be J possible streamflow levels 
in each period and T periods. We take the probability distri-
bution over streamflows to be "objective," since historical 
streamflows are tabled for most major rivers and their trib-
utaries, and we assume that water users are aware of these 
data and make use of them in their decision making. Again, 
mainly for notational convenience, we take the probability 
distribution over streamflows to be stationary with respect to 
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time, and intertemporal independence is assumed as well. 
Thus the joint probability of the sequence of streamflows (xii• 
x1,. · • · , xi<) is given by nh nh · · · n1,. 
As a matter of notation, let 
x(j 1 -+ j,) = (xh, · · · , x 1,) 
We first examine the cost-benefit problem in the context of 
an Arrow-Debrew [Arrow, 1964] type world in which there is 
a complete set of contingent claim markets all of which open 
at time 0. Consumers make binding commitments to con-
sumption over the T period horizon through purchases and 
sales of contingent claims to the goods y and z at time O; all 
market transactions occur in the period 0 contingent claim 
markets. Randomness enters the picture because of stochastic 
streamflows; there is no randomness emanating from the con-
sumption side or from the supply side with respect to com-
modity z. 
Let yh .. . i/ denote the number of contingent claim contracts 
acquired by consumer i, satisfying the property that each 
claim pays one unit of good y in period t if tqe streamflow 
sequence x(j 1 -+ j,) occurs. Similarly, let ph .. :i• denote the price . 
of such a contingent claim contract. zh .. ·i,' is the number of · 
contingent claims to z acquired by i, satisfying the property 
that each claim pays one unit of good z in period t if the 
streamflow x(j 1 -+ j,) occurs, with qh ... Ji being the price of such 
a contract. Note also that if the streamflow sequence x(j1 -+ j,) 
occurs, then consumption by consumer i in period t is the 
vector (yh ... i/• zh .. ·Jr'), because of the absence of spot markets 
in the periods following period O; that is, purchases of contin-
gent claim contracts are binding commitments to consump-
tion. (This is the same assumption made by Arrow [1964] in 
his treatment of a contingent claim economy. In a variant of 
this model, Arrow also considers a "security market" world in 
which spot markets exist but future spot prices are known 
with certainty at time 0.) 
To simplify notation, let !l, denote the index over stream-
flows x(j 1 -+ j,) commencing at time 1 and terminating at time 
t. Let 
T 
0= un, 
r=l 
denote the set of all index sets over streamflow sequences, 
ranging from one to T period sequences. Then n, is also the 
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index set over consumptions in period t and over prices (p, q) 
of contingent claim contracts to tth period consumption. 
Given the usual separability assumptions concerning prefer-
ences, the decision problem for consumer i reduces to the 
following: 
T 
max EUi = L fl/ L 1t,u,'(y/, z,i) (1) 
<Y',z'> t = 1 r •flt 
subject to 
T 
w'cn = I .5' I CM/ - P.Y.' - q.z.'> = o 
t s:: l rE f1t 
where (y', z1) is the matrix of contingent claim purchases by 
consumer i, f11 is consumer fs personal discount fact.or, 
c5 = [1/(1 + i)], where i is the market rate of interest, M/ is 
income for consumer i, and W 1(T) is consumer i's wealth at 
time T. We take M/ = N/ + p,y/ + q,.i/, where y/ and z, 1 
are the endowments of consumer i of y and z at time t if the 
stream flow sequence r occurs, and N/ is i's share of water 
profits given r. In what follows we assume that .Y.' = 0 for all i, 
r. 
This gives rise to the usual first-order conditions, assuming 
a regular interior maximum, that is, 
oEU1 0W1(n 
--. -A.--.-=0 
oy/ oy/ 
oEu' ow'cn 
--. -A.--.-=0 
oz/ oz: (2) 
w'<n=o 
Given the structure of markets outlined above, we are inter-
ested in constructing a measure, in the form of consumers' 
surplus, of the benefits associated with controlling a river. In 
particular, we are interested in a measure of the benefits from 
a change from a completely uncontrolled river to one with a 
dam-reservoir complex controlling flows, with a reservoir stor-
age capacity of S* units (acre feet, milliliters) of water, where 
S* is some given constant. To finesse the well-known aggrega-
tion problems plaguing consumers' surplus, we will instead 
calculate consumer's surplus for one individual, say consumer 
i. Then the relevant measure of benefits for the consumer is 
presumably the amount of discounted income that consumer i 
is willing to give up to be indifferent between facing a con-
trolled river with S* units of storage capacity and facing an 
uncontrolled river. Thus we are dealing with the compensated 
demand curve(s) for yi, along which EU' is a constant. In the 
usual partial equilibrium approach, we assume that the prices 
q< > of the nonwater commodity z are unaffected by changes 
in the water storage capacity levels. 
To simplify the notation, we will drop the superscript iden-
tifying the individual where there is no problem of ambiguity. 
Let DPV denote the discounted present value of income for 
consumer i. Then DPV is given by 
T 
DPV= I.5' L M, (3) 
t= 1 .sen, 
Since W(T) = 0 is a binding constraint that holds for all 
values of S, then, given a change dS in the reservoir storage 
level, dW(T) = 0. Taking q, constant for all r, we have 
" [oW(T) " (oW(T) oy, dDPV=(-)L... --+ L. ---
ren op, .. n oy, op, 
+ oW(n oz,)](dp,) dS (4) 
oz, op, dS 
Along a compensated demand curve, dEU = O; thus 
dEU = L [ L oEU oy, + oEU oz,] (dp,) dS = o (5) 
, 011 ,. 11 oy, op, oz, op, dS 
By the first-order conditions (2), 
oEU = A. oW(T) 
oy, oy, 
oEu =A. owcn 
oz, oz, 
(6) 
Given nonsatiation, A. > 0, and thus (4) reduces to 
dDPV = - L (oW(T)) (dp,) dS = £ .5' L y:(dp,) dS 
ren op, dS r= I ren. dS 
(7) 
where y: is the compensated demand curve for y,. 
Thus the consumer surplus measure relevant for the com-
parison between an uncontrolled river and one with a reser-
voir capacity of S* units is given by 
T JS• (d ) cs = ( - ) L .5' L y: :; dS 
t=l l'E{l, 0 
(8) 
In the special case where y: depends only on p, and where 
S affects only one price p., then by a change of variables we 
end up with the usual consumer's surplus area computed from 
the compensated demand curve for y., but clearly this is a case 
with no practical significance for the evaluation of the typical 
water project. In any case, it is clear that the consumer's sur-
plus measure calculated in (8) is of precisely the same form as 
the corresponding consumer's surplus measure for the cer-
tainty case. (For example, see Samuelson [1947] for a classic 
treatment of consumer surplus under certainty.) The major 
difference is that the contingent claim version incorporates the 
alternative possible streamflows indexed by the set !l. As 
Rogerson [1979] has noted in a different context, this corre-
spondence reflects in part at least the fact that uncertainty is 
assumed to enter the picture in our model only from the 
supply side of the market. 
Turning to the supply side of the market, assume that a 
public agency is charged with the task of operating the dam-
reservoir complex, using the rule of maximizing expected pro-
fits taking prices (of contingent claims) as parameters. In ana-
lyzing the decision making process of the agency, timing of 
inflows and releases is of importwnce. We assume that in any 
period, inflows and releases occur at the end of the period, just 
before the reservoir level is measured. The tth period begins at 
time t - 1 and ends at time t. 
Let Sit ···i, be the amount of water stored in the reservo'.r at 
time t , given the sequence of streamftows x(j1 -+ j,) and given 
ail optimal (expected profit maximizing) release policy. Yit ... i,* 
is the optimal level of releases in period t, given the streamflow 
sequence x(j 1 -+ j,), and R ii .. . 1, is the amount of water available 
for release in the tth period, being measured near the end of 
that period, after inflows are known but before releases have 
occurred. 
Then we have the following accounting identities: 
S, = (1 - cx)S, +xi, - y,• SE !l, _ 1 r = (s,j,) (9) 
where ex is the percentage loss in reservoir stocks due to evap-
oration; 
R, = (1 - cx)S, + x1, SE Qr-1 r=(s,j,) (10) 
'I 
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so that 
R, = (1 - cr)[R, - y, *] + x1, s E !l, _ 1 r = (s, j,) (11) 
The dam-reservoir operator then chooses a sequence of re-
leases to maximize expected profits. Let r = U1 , .. . , j,) E n,, 
and let x(r) = x(j1 -> j,). Then at time t, when the streamflow 
sequence x(r) is already known to have occurred, the operator 
chooses the release y, • to maximize V(R,), where 
J 
V(R.) = b'P.Y. + b' + 1 I Ttj, + l 
jr + l = 1 
max V[(l - a)(R. - y,) + x1,. ,] (12) 
O ~ R1 -y1 :!5; S• 
with S = (r, jr +1) E Qr +!· 
V(R,) is to be maximized subject to the constraint 
0 :s; R, - Y. :s; S* (13) 
Th\!S at time T , with R.., units of water available for release 
(w = (j 1, · · · , h) E !lr). y.., is chosen to max bT p..,y.., subject to 
0 :s; R.., - y.., :s; S*. 
Given the linear increasing objective function together with 
the linear constraints, clearly the optimal policy involves set-
ting y.., * = R..,. 
At T - 1, with Ru units of water available (v = (j1, 
j r -1) E ilr - i), Yu is chosen to 
max V(Ru) =max bT - lPuYu 
J 
+ bT L rt1rp..,[(l - cr)(Ru - y.) + xlr] 
ir= 1 
subject to 0 :s; R u - Yu :s; s•. where w = (v, h) E QT. 
Thus 
av r - 1[ ~ J = b Pu - b(l - cr) _L.. rt1rPw 
Yu Jr = l 
The term inside the square brackets is the difference be-
tween the value at time T - 1 of a unit of water released at 
T - 1, and the discounted expected value at time T - l of a 
unit of water stored at time T - 1 for release at time T. The 
"own interest rate" y = cr/(1 - er) is included as a discount 
factor, with 
b(l - er)= (-
1 
.) (-
1 
) 1+1 l+ y 
When the term inside the square brackets is positive, the 
optimal release Yu• = R u, the stock of water available. When 
the term is negative, Yu• = max {O, Ru - S* }, that is, as much 
water as possible is stored. When the term inside the square 
brackets is zero, then any feasible release is optimal. 
In the general case of an arbitrary index t and streamflow 
sequence indexed by r E n,, the relevant criterion for the dam-
reservoir operator is the expression 
J J b' 1 - Cl ' rt . . . 1t 
. L ( ) J, + 1 J, +,Pw, 
Jr +.1= l 
(14) 
where s = l , · · · , T - t and w, = (r, j ,+ 1, · · ·, j, +.) E !l, +,. 
If (14) is positive, then it pays (in discounted expected profit 
terms) to release as much water as possible at time t ; if it is 
negative, then there is a time in the future such that water 
released at that time has a higher discounted expected va lue 
today than water released today, so as much water as possible 
should be held in storage. If the expression is zero, any feasible 
release is optimal. 
Using (14) to regulate releases determines the supply of 
water to be made available at any point in time for any given 
sequence of streamflows, and hence this determines the supply 
of contingent claims to water offered by the dam-reservoir 
operator as a function of the set of prices P< > for contingent 
claims, and the storage capacity s•. 
Equilibrium in the market for contingent claims occurs 
when there is simultaneous clearing of all such markets, so 
that the price vector (p, q) satisfies 
I 
I y/ (p; q) = Y. *(p, S*) SEQ (15) 
l= l 
I I 
I z/(p ; q) = I t..' S EQ (16) 
i= l i= 1 
Solving this system of 2(J x T) simultaneous equations in p, 
q for each value of S, 0 :s; S :s; s• would (in principle!) enable 
us to determine the values of the terms (dp, /dS) appearing in 
the expression (8) for consumer's surplus and hence to com-
plete the formal calculation of that magnitude. We will not 
attempt that task here. 
Under the appropriate assumptions, when total (consumer 
plus producer) surplus is maximized, then an ex ante Pareto 
optimum is achieved ; that is, it is not possible to make one 
consumer better off in terms of expected utility without 
making some other consumer worse off. It should also be 
pointed out that expected utility calculations involve only the 
probabilities associated with streamflows, since this is the only 
source of randomness in our model of a water economy with a 
complete set of contingent claim markets. We next turn to the 
other extreme, an economy with no contingent claim markets 
but with spot markets open in each period. 
3. A SPOT MARKET WATER ECONOMY 
In this section, we consider an economy with no contingent 
claim or futures markets but instead one with a complete set 
of spot markets, opening at each of the T dates in the plan-
ning horizon. From the point of view of a typical consumer in 
this economy, there are now two sources of uncertainty, that 
is, uncertainty as to streamflows at various dates in time and 
uncertainty as to the prices that will prevail in future spot 
markets. To minimize notational clutter, we will assume that 
both kinds of uncertainty get incorporated into · the con-
sumer's subjective probability distribution over prices in 
future spot markets. Tha t is, each consumer has a subjective 
probability distribution function (pdf) over the spot prices that 
will prevail at each point in time, which pdf reflects the un-
derlying uncertainty as to streamflows and the behavior of 
other consumers ; p, is now the price of good y in period t and 
q, is the price per unit of good z in period t, both being 
random variables. The reservoir storage capacity S then shows 
up as a parameter of the consumer's pdf over prices, where 
f,(p ,, · · · , Pr ; q,, · · · , qr ; S) is the (subjective) pdf at time t over 
prices from time t to T . 
Once again we are interested in constructing a measure of 
the benefits to a consumer from the construction of a dam-
reservoir complex with capacity S* to control streamflows. 
The decision problem for the consumer over a T priced hor-
izon is to choose consumption vectors y = (y1, · · ·, Yr) and 
z = (z 1, · ·-, zr) to maximize 
EV = J/3' f · · · f U ,(y,, z,) 
· fr(p,, ·· ·, Pr ; q,, · · ·, Pr ; S) dp dq (17) 
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subject to 
T 
wcn = I (M, - p,y, - q.z,>1<1 + i)' = o (18) 
t=l 
In this formulation the (constant) one period interest rate i 
is known with certainty. We assume a perfect capital market. 
Let 
T 
DPV = L M,/(1 + i)' (19) 
t= 1 
denote the discounted present value of income, and let 
r-1 
aEU dpl aEU dS aEU dDPV = 0 
+ ap1 dS + as + aoPv 
(26) 
From the first-order conditions, aEU/ay1 = oEU/oz1 = 0. 
By the usual partial equilibrium assumption, dqifdS = 0. Also 
note that 
while 
M,• = DPV - L (p,,y, + q,,z,)/(l + i)' t = l, · · ·, T (20) where 
,s= 1 
denote the net amount of DPV available to be spent from 
time t on. A basic problem with a sequential consumption 
model such as this one is the default problem. Here we simply 
make the (heroic) assumption that default never occurs, i.e., 
M,* is always positive. This avoids introducing a complicated 
budget constraint in which consumption is at a subsistence 
level if default ever occurs. 
The consumer presumably adopts a dynamic programming 
approach to solving his decision problem. We illustrate for the 
case of a two-period horizon. 
In the case where T = 2, then at time 2, when p2 , q2 , and 
M 2* are known the consumer chooses y2 and z2 to 
subject to 
M2* = P2Y2 + q2z2 
Solving this problem, we obtain the demand functions 
Y2 = Y2<P2, q2, M 2 *) 
Z2 = z2<P2. q2, M2*) 
(21) 
(22) 
Reverting to time l, the consumer chooses y 1 and z1 to maxi-
mize 
EU= PU1(y., Z1) + P2 ff U2[y2<P2, q2, M2*), 
z2(p2, q2, M 2 *)]f(p2, q2, S) dp2 dq2 (23) 
First-order conditions characterizing an (unconstrained) 
maximum are given by 
aEu = P au1 + P2 aEu2 = 0 
ay1 ay1 ay. 
(24) 
aEu = P au1 + P2 aEu2 = 0 
azl azl azl 
Given this framework, how much is the consumer willing to 
pay (in terms of DPV) for an inceease dS in the storage capaci-
ty of the reservoir? Since the consumer is to be indifferent 
between a situation with a storage capacity of S and one with 
a storage capacity of S + dS, we have 
dEU =0 (25) 
where EU= EU(p 1, q 1, y 1, zt> DPV, S), since M 2 * = M 2 *(p., 
qi, Yt· Z1, DPV). 
Hence we have 
!~~ ! = ff [ ~~: (a!;> + ~~:) a::. }<P2. q2, S) dp2 dq2 
Hence we obtain 
dDPV = (-1-)y (dPi) dS 
1 + i 1 dS 
- [(aEU/aS)/(oEU2/0M2*)] dS (27) 
where 
aEu i"' i"' af 
-- = u 2(y2, z2) - <P2, q2, S) dp2 dq2 = aEu 2/as 
as 0 0 as 
Given a change from an uncontrolled river (S = 0) to a river 
with a dam-reservoir complex with reservoir storage capacity 
of s• units, the relevant consumer surplus measure in a spot 
market economy is given by 
CS= IDPV(S = S*) - DPV(S = 0)1 
( 1 ) rs• (dp ) rs• ( aEU /as ) 
- 1 + i Jo Yic d; dS +Jo iJEU2 /~M2* dS 
(28) 
Here again y 1 c is the compensated demand curve for y 1 • 
Two things should be noted about this measure of con-
sumer surplus as contrasted to that for the case of the contin-
gent claim economy. First, only the first-period compensated 
demand curve appears in the CS measure; benefits in the 
second period are already incorporated into the first-period 
demand curve through the dynamic programming algorithm. 
Second, the CS measure includes a term that is nonobservable, 
representing the benefits that accrue to the consumer from the 
change in S, when p 1, y 1 and z 1 remain unchanged. A less 
variable time stream of releases increases expected utility of 
second period consumption, even when first period consump-
tions (and prices) are unaffected. Since iJEU2 /aS ~ 0 and 
iJ EU 2 / iJM 2 • > 0, using the first integral on the right in (28) to 
measure the benefits from the dam-reservoir complex under-
states the value of such benefits. Since the market (compen-
sated) demand curve does not reveal the information con-
tained in the second term of (28), there is a need for sup-
plementary work by the cost-benefit analyst, designed to elicit 
information as to the properties of the underlying EU func-
tion. (It has been pointed out that the compensated demand 
curve itself is unobserved, so that in practice cost-benefit stud-
ies use the area under the ordinary demand curve as a proxy 
for the true consumer surplus area. Willig [1976] has shown 
that under relatively weak conditions, the error involved in 
using the observed ordinary demand curve in consumer sur-
plus calculations is minor. It is not clear how a proxy could be 
constructed to estimate the unobserved area identified in (28). 
j 
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One possible approach would be to estimate the error in-
volved in ignoring the second term in (28) by using, say, a 
constant coefficient of risk aversion utility function with a 
normal approximation to the density. This has not been at-
tempted by this author.) 
The extension to the T period case is straightforward. 
Define H,(y,, z,, M,*) by 
H,(y,, z., M,*) = U,(y,, z,) 
+,BE[ max H,+ 1(Y1+ 1, z,+ 1, M,+ 1 *)] (29) 
Y1+1,zr+1 
where 
M,+ 1 * = M,* - (p,y, + q,z,)/ (1 + i)' 
Then at any time t, t = 1, · · ·, T, the consumer chooses y,. z, 
to maximize H,. By an inductive argument it can be shown 
that this leads to the derivation of the demand functions 
y, = y,(p,, q,, M,*, S) 
z, = z,(p,. q,, M,*, S) 
(30) 
t = 2, ··· , T. 
Hence at time 1, the consumer chooses y 1 anq z1 to maxi-
mize EU, where EU is given by 
T 
EU= ,BU(yl> zi) + L: ,B'EU, 
rs2 
· [y,(p,, q,, M,*, S), z,(p,, q,, M,*, S)] (31) 
First-order conditions are given by 
aEU = ,8 au + P1 f ,8' aEU, = 0 
ay1 ay1 •=l aM,* 
aEu au r aEu, 
- = .B - + q1 L: .B' -- = o az 1 az 1 r=i aM,* 
(32) 
Consider now the derivation of a consumer surplus mea-
sure. EU= EU(y 1, z 1, p1, ql> DPV, S) so that under the partial 
equilibrium assumption, again we have 
dDPV = -[ (aEU/ap1) (dpl)- (aEU/aS) J d 
(aEU/aDPV) dS (aEU/aDPV) s 
where 
aEu = -(~) f .B' aEu, 
ap1 1 + i •=l aM,* 
aEU = f ,8' aEU, 
aDPV t=2 aM,* 
(33) 
Hence the consumer surplus measure for consumer i, for the 
evaluation of the benefits from increasing s from 0 to s• is 
again given by 
CS= IDPV(S = S*) - DPV(S = 0)1 
( 1 ) rs• c(dp1) rs• (aEU/aS) = - 1 + i Jo Yt dS dS +Jo (aEU/aDPV) dS 
(34) 
While the expression for aEU/as is considerably more com-
plicated in this case than in the two-period case, still 
aEU/aS ~ 0, so that if the area under the compensated y 1 < 
demand curve is used as a measure of consumer surplus, this 
understates the value of the benefits derived from the dam-
reservoir project. 
On the supply side the introduction of uncertainty as to 
future spot market prices does not raise any new conceptual 
problems, since the decision problem for the dam-reservoir 
operator is one of dynamic programming even when price 
uncertainty is absent. Given an expected income maximizing 
operator, the effect of introducing price uncertainty is simply 
that of replacing the known prices Pr of contingent claims 
associated with the streamflow sequence x(r), with the ex-
pected value Epr of the uncertain spot market price, in the 
operator's criterion function. That is, the rule for the operator 
is based on the expression 
~ b'(l - et)'n1 · · · n . Ep J r+l )1+11 w, 
it+•= 1 [ 
J 
Pr-max L 
& ir+t=l 
(35) 
wheres= 1, . . . ' T - t and w. = (r, j,+ l• .. .• j,+.) E n,+s· 
If the term inside the brackets is positive, the operator 
should empty the reservoir at time t, releasing as much water 
as he can; if it is negative, then as much water as possible is 
stored; and if the expression is zero, any feasible release is 
consistent with a maximum of expected profits. 
Equilibrium in the spot market for water in period t, given 
that the streamflow sequence x(r) has occurred, is given by the 
conditions 
I 
L Y/(p,, q,, M,*, S) = y,*(p,., q., S) (36) 
i=l 
I I 
L: z,'(p,, q,. M,*, S) = L: ir ' (37) 
i=l i = l 
where y/ is the demand for water by consumer i in period t, z/ 
is demand for other goods by consumer i in period t , and Yr* 
is releases by the dam-reservoir operator in period t, given the 
streamflow sequence x(r), r En,. 
Once again, in principle, the system represented by (36) 
could be solved to obtain the appropriate equilibrium spot 
prices and in particular, a rational expectations equilibrium 
might be of interest to explore. (It should be emphasized that 
the system represented by (36) and (37) is quite a different 
system than that represented by the equilibrium conditions 
(15) and (16). Technically, the economy described by (36) and 
(37) is a sequential economy, with equilibrium prices revealed 
only after the random events (streamflows, market decisions) 
have occurred. In contrast, equilibrium prices satisfying (15) 
and (16) are those that arise in the time 0 contingent claim 
markets, and hence these prices are known before any random 
events take place. Given nondegenerate pdfs, the only situ-
ation in which the two systems become formally equivalent is 
when spot markets exist at times 1, · · · , T, but contingent 
claim contracts exist which specify payoffs based not only on 
the occurrence of streamflows but also on the basis of se-
quences of spot price vectors, one such claim for each possible 
combination of streamflow and spot price vector sequences. 
Clearly, this would require a continuum on contingent claim 
contracts and markets. In this case, the equilibrium conditions 
for the sequential economy would reduce to those given by 
(15) and (16). However, because the storage level S still ap-
pears as a parameter of the consumer's pdf over spot prices, 
there would continue to be an unobserved term in the con-
sumer surplus measure in this case.) 
4. EXAMPLE 
To illustrate, consider the case where U, = y,z,, t = 1, 2, 
with 
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Then it is easy to verify that 
Y2 = M2*/2P2 
so that 
Hence 
where 
K = !!_ S + 1 In (2S + 3) In 2 
4S+2 S+l 
Thus 
Kqt(DPV) 
y, = 
1 + 2ptql 
Kp 1(DPV) 
Zt = 
1 + 2p,q, 
are the ordinary demand curves, and the compensated 
demand function for y 1, y 1', with EU= EO, is given by 
y,' = {KDPVp 1 + [K 2p1 20Pv2 - (KDPV2 - EU')(4Kp1 2 
+ Pt /q ,)] 112 }(4Kp, 2 + Pt /q 1)- I 
Note that 
aEU2 =(M2 *)2 ~[ln2S+3_ 1 ]>O 
as 4 (S + 2)2 s + 1 (2s + 3) 
while aEU 2 /aM* = 2EU2 / M* > 0. 
5. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS 
We have examined the construction of consumer surplus 
measures appropriate to the evaluation of a water project in 
two different economic environments: (1) an economy con-
taining a complete set of contingent claim markets (and with 
no spot markets), and (2) an economy with a complete set of 
spot markets (but no contingent claim markets). In the Arrow-
Debreu type world, the consumer surplus measure that applies 
under uncertainty as to streamflows is of the same form as the 
measure that would apply under certainty, being the sum of 
the discounted consumer surplus areas for each period. The 
only difference between the certainty and uncertainty cases is 
that under uncertainty there is a consumer surplus area for 
each possible state of the world (sequence of streamftows) for 
each period. 
Things are quite different in the case of a spot market econ-
omy. In the first place, only the consumer surplus area for 
first-period compensated demand appears in the consumer 
surplus measure; the dynamic programming approach implies 
that all of the benefits over the T period horizon are captured 
in the first-period compensated demand function. But of more 
interest is the fact that the "correct" measure of consumer 
surplus includes an unobserved term, measuring the benefits 
accruing to the consumer from the change in expected utility 
due to a shift in the pdf over future spot prices, given un-
changed first-period prices and consumptions. 
The unobserved term in the CS measure raises some basic 
questions about the welfare implications of a CS measure de-
signed to express the benefits accruing from a project such as 
a dam-reservoir complex, when the effect (in part) of the proj-
ect is to alter the probability distributions of consumers over 
future spot prices. This is related to what is involved in the 
notion of an ex ante Pareto optimum. The idea is this. Ex ante 
optimality refers to any feasible allocation that maximizes the 
expected utility of one consumer for given levels of expected 
utility for other consumers; alternatively, at an ex ante opti-
mum, we cannot make one consumer better off in terms of 
expected utility without making some other consumer worse 
off in terms of expected utility. But this is to hold for given 
subjective probability distributions over payoffs. If pdfs 
change, then any resulting allocation is simply non com-
parable (in the ex ante sense) with allocations holding before 
the change in pdfs. 
The CS measure in (34) measures the benefits to an individ-
ual resulting from a parameter change that alters his or her 
subjective pdf over future price vectors. While the CS measure 
in (34) is the measure relevant for decision making with re-
spect to a proposed dam-reservoir project, it is irrelevant to 
policy decisions linked to ex ante optimality or to the attain-
ment of ex ante Pareto superior allocations because of the 
effect of the dam-reservoir project on the pdrs of consumers. 
What is needed in the case of the spot market economy is a 
different notion of a Pareto ranking, one defined over vectors 
(ft, · · · , J1) of subjective pdfs, where the superscript refers to 
consumers. In this ranking, one vector is Pareto superior to 
another if the vector of expected utilities (E.U1, · · ·, EU1) 11$-
sociated with the first vector of pdf's is weakly larger (compo-
nent by component) than the vector of expected utilities as-
sociated with the second vector of pdf's. A Pareto optimum is 
achieved with a feasible vector of pdf's if no other feasible 
vector of pdf's is Pareto superior to it. This is a completely 
different kind of Pareto ranking than the ex ante ranking, and 
presumably, it is this difference that in part at least accounts 
for the quite different specifications of CS as between (8) and 
(34), including the unobserved component in (34). As noted 
above, even if the sequential economy represented by equilib-
rium conditions (35) and (36) is reduced to a contingent claim 
economy, the unobserved component of consumer surplus still 
remains since S, the water storage level, is a parameter of the 
pdf over spot market prices. 
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